The Four Faces of Political Participation in Argentina: Using Latent Class Analysis To Study Political Behavior

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Abstract

In this paper we use latent class analysis to identify the *four faces of political participation*. Previous research has generally focused on conventional forms of political participation (for example, voting), with some research looking as well at unconventional forms of political participation, like protesting. Moreover, most research studies these forms of participation separately. However, citizens actually engage in both conventional and unconventional participation simultaneously, and here we present a methodology that can identify citizens who engage in both, neither, or only one form of participation. Using our approach, we examine a series of hypotheses about how social, political, and economic grievances lead citizens to engage in each face of political participation. We apply this methodology to recent survey data from Argentina, which we argue is an excellent case for studying both forms of participation simultaneously. This application demonstrates the utility of the latent class approach for studying the four faces of political participation.

Keywords: political participation, civic engagement, unconventional participation, latent class analysis, finite mixture modeling.

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Data and software code used to reproduce all tables and figures in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/20FTAW.

Introduction

Political participation is how citizens communicate their opinions, interests, and needs to government and the broader society (Verba and Nie, 1972). It is not yet clear whether citizen involvement affects policy outcomes.¹ But by electing representatives and voicing their views in a variety of ways, individuals develop a sense of belonging, responsibility, efficacy, and trust in democratic institutions that they would not otherwise experience.² Thus, political participation is not just important because of its potential implications for public policy, but because it *makes* citizens. What *types* of citizens it makes, we argue in this paper, depends on the availability of opportunities for political participation, individual circumstances, and their political experiences.

In established democracies, diverse forms of involvement are available. Citizens can participate in conventional activities that are embedded in the political system and institutions, and are deemed appropriate and legitimate by the broader society (Verba and Nie, 1972). The quintessential conventional activity is voting, although citizens can also petition their representatives, attend meetings of political parties, assist campaigns, or even run for office. But there are also unconventional activities, in which individuals relate to the polity in less orthodox ways. The most widely practiced among these activities are protests and strikes (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Research on political participation has mostly focused on conventional activities, especially voting. This is largely because voting is an important aspect of participatory democracy, but also because it is easy to study. Other aspects of political behavior have received less study (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). In particular, unconventional participation has received limited attention from scholars, most likely because unconventional political behavior is difficult to conceptualize and hard to measure (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Chong, 1991). This narrow focus has hindered our understanding of political participation. Moreover, by studying conventional and unconventional activities individually, most research ignores the possibility that political actions are intertwined.³

We take the literature in a new direction by using a novel methodological approach to modeling political participation, one that considers conventional and unconventional activities simultaneously,

¹There has been a great deal of research attempting to relate voter participation to policy outcomes; for a methodological critique of past research and a review of that literature, see Fowler (2013).

 $^{^{2}}$ For research on the association between government trust and political efficacy see, for example, Abramson and Aldrich (1982), Gamson (1968), Muller (1977), Milbrath and Goel (1977).

 $^{^{3}}$ One exception is Desposato and Norrander (2009), who look at the gender gap in conventional and unconventional political participation in Latin America using a broadly comparative approach. Dalton (2008) analyses the relation between citizens' sense of duty and participation in conventional and unconventional activities, but his approach considers these activities independently.

as expressions of each individual's interests and concerns. To this end, we introduce a two-dimensional latent class model that captures individuals' propensities to participate in several political activities. Our findings show that the way in which participation in the different activities load on the two dimensions provides some rationale for the traditional classification of political activities into conventional and unconventional ones. That is, activities generally considered to be conventional load higher in one of the two dimensions, while activities generally considered unconventional load more in the other dimension. But there are also activities that load similarly on both dimensions, defying simple ad hoc classification. Importantly, however, our methodology allows the data to determine which types of participatory acts load on which dimension, rather than relying on arbitrary classifications based on the researcher's assumptions.

We use the different intensities in the latent variables to identify what we term the four faces of political participation. That is, some citizens will be more active in both the conventional and the unconventional dimensions of political activities (activists); others will be mostly disengaged from politics (outsiders); and others will be more active in one dimension of political activities but not the other (agitators and conventionals). As Dunning (2011) argued, "fighting and voting can be strategic complements, rather than substitutes... the relevant question is not whether political actors opt to participate in elections or engage in armed conflict, but rather why and how they engage in both voting and fighting" (page 333). Our model then allows us to study how contextual variables and individual level characteristics help explain the classification of citizens into a type, shedding light on who engages in the different combinations of participatory activities; that is, who finds conventional and unconventional activities to be substitutes or complements. Our main analysis is focused on three experiential factors that the literature identifies as connected to political participation: economic worries, perceptions of corruption, and concerns about crime.

We apply this model of political participation to recent data from Argentina, which provides an interesting case for our analysis. While citizens in Argentina participate in all sorts of conventional activities, unconventional political participation, typically in the form of protests and street blockades, is an everyday fixture of civic life (Arce and Mangonnet, 2012; Villalón, 2002, 2007). Protest activity in Argentina has also shown significant effects on policy in the last 15 years.⁴ Thus, Argentina's case

⁴For example, demonstrations fueled by economic hardship in late 2001 led to the downfall of the De la Rua government (Arce and Mangonnet, 2012); the death of two protesters due to police repression led to the early departure of the Duhalde government (Bonner, 2009). A blockade of an international bridge between Argentina and Uruguay by environmental groups that began in 2003 fueled international tensions between the countries (Payne, 2011). Also, protests and road blockades by farmers and landowners in 2008 produced significant shortages in the county, and resulted in an important schism between President Fernández and her vice-president (Calvo and Murillo, 2012).

allows for the study of the less frequent political activities, the unconventional ones, together with those more commonly observed and measured, making it an ideal case for the analysis of the four faces of political participation.

It is important to note that Argentina is a nation that practices compulsory voting. While compulsory voting was traditionally weakly enforced (Pintor and Gratschew, 2002), the electoral law was modified in 2012 (Ley 26.744) to impose sanctions on those electors that did not vote.⁵ Despite these changes in the law, turnout in presidential elections immediately before and after the changes did not change significantly.⁶ Given that the change in the enforcement of mandatory voting did not have any significant effect on voter participation, it is unlikely that it had any effect on other participatory activities. Furthermore, this also supports our argument that compulsory voting law in Argentina (with or without enforcement) should not present a challenge in generalizing the results of our paper to countries where voting is voluntary.

Participatory Types and the Motivation for Participation

Conventional forms of political participation have long been the focus of research, in particular the act of voting. Voting is a public activity, and data on who votes is readily available. Much is known about who votes, and why citizens do not vote, based on analyses of data from the United States (e.g., Abramson, 1983; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Leighley and Nagler, 2013). But there is also a good amount of research on other political activities, like contacting political officials (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), volunteering (Campbell, 2006), campaigning for candidates (Norris, 2001), and other methods of direct involvement (Rosenberg, 2008).⁷

Other activities, generally considered unconventional behavior, have received less attention from researchers. These activities are more difficult to study because individuals get involved in them

⁵The new law (Ley 26.744 Modificatoria del Código Nacional Electoral, Congreso de la Nación Argentina, 2012) imposes a fine of AR\$ 50 for missing the primaries, and AR\$ 100 for the general elections. In U.S. dollars, the general election fine corresponded to US\$ 17.12 in 2013 and US\$10.47 in 2015, and represented 3% of the monthly minimum salary in 2013, and 1.8% in 2015. Several groups of electors are excluded from paying the fines. These include voters over the age of 70 or under 18, those who are sick (with proof), or those more than 500 kilometers away from their voting location during election day. If the fine is not paid within a 60 day period, offenders face restrictions in administrative procedures with national, provincial, and municipal governments for one year, and cannot be employed in the public sector for 3 years.

⁶Turnout in the 2011 Presidential Elections stood at 80.2%, while turnout in the 2015 Presidential Elections stood at 81.1%. Figure A1 in the Supplementary Materials shows that while turnout increased in some provinces after the reform, this increase was smaller than that observed between the two Presidential elections prior to the reform, suggesting that changes in turnout corresponded mainly to pre-reform trends rather than the effect of legal changes. Figure A2 shows that while turnout was generally increasing in municipalities in Buenos Aires province prior to the reform, there is no identifiable pattern after the reform was implemented.

⁷See also, Zukin et al., 2006; McDonald and Popkin, 2001.

in a more irregular and infrequent manner (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Chong, 1991). This means that unconventional political behavior is harder to conceptualize, measure, and study. Yet political protests are widespread around the world, and they can have a significant effect on policy and the viability of governments. Mass political protests during the Arab Spring led to significant changes in the political landscape in that region; protests in the late 1980s in the Communist Block contributed to the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe: marches, boycotts, and sit-ins during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement contributed to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the United States; the Occupy and Indignant Movements denouncing inequality and austerity measures gave momentum to anti-establishment parties in several European countries. But not all protests are massive movements that sweep across nations. Many protests are small, with a focused goal. The examples are countless and present in almost every country: rallies to help crime victims in the neighborhood; employees demanding better working conditions; communities trying to protect the environment around them; demonstrations against police brutality, and so on. As Dalton (2008) notes there has been a shift in focus from electoral modes of participation, to non-electoral methods of political action.⁸ Ignoring unconventional forms of political participation hinders our understanding of the citizen as a political animal.

Because of its more infrequent and irregular nature, efforts to understand unconventional forms of participation are hindered by the lack of data on the subject. Due to the relative rarity of opportunities for studying unconventional participation in established democracies, some of the most notable studies of the subject have opted for measuring individuals' *potential* for unconventional behavior instead of actual involvement in unconventional activities (see, for instance, Barnes and Kaase, 1979 and the criticism of this study by Budge 1981). The justification for this approach has been that, since individuals' ability to participate in these activities depends on the existence of opportunity structures (Jennings and van Deth, 1989), and since these structures are typically issue-specific and may exist (or not) at any given moment in time, then measures of actual involvement obtained using survey methods are of little use (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Jennings and van Deth, 1989). Due to problems such as these, researchers have not yet provided solid evidence of why protests happen, what triggers them, and who participates in them.

But what drives individuals towards more unconventional forms of political participation? In relatively open political systems where civil liberties are well protected, protests can provide a cheap

⁸See also Norris (2001).

and fast alternative to the potentially slow and bureaucratic mechanisms of more traditional activities. This is likely to be the case in transitional societies where "the development of political institutions [...] does not keep pace with social mobilization" (Milbrath and Goel, 1977, 126). Systems which fail to protect civil liberties, where there are few channels for public input into the political process, or where government is unresponsive, can frustrate citizens to the point where they resort to protest and demonstration (Chong, 1991). Even in democratic countries where political institutions are weak, there is a stronger tendency for citizens to participate in unconventional activities to make their voices heard (Machado et al., 2011). But, at the same time, participation in unconventional activities can also have individual causes. In particular, dissatisfaction, relative deprivation, the feeling of being left behind, or ideological motivations, are usually thought of as motivators for protest (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Mann, 1970; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Muller, 1979). Usually, the gap between individuals' expectations and achievements is viewed as motivation for individuals to move into more unconventional activities like protests (Feirabend and Feirabend, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Sears and McCohanay, 1970). Other recent research has stressed the importance of sponsoring groups, especially the factors like the group's political ideology, in determining whether individuals decide to participate in violent unconventional political behavior (Thomas and Bond, 2015).

Like most studies of political participation, we adopt a cost-benefit framework. That is, whether an individual citizen decides to engage in conventional or unconventional political activities (or both) depends on their perception of the costs of that action, the potential benefits of that action, whether they think the action will affect the policies they are concerned about, and on the citizen's resources and conceptions of whether it is their duty to act (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). The factors that might alter this calculus for a citizen are complex, and in many situations a particular factor might increase the costs or benefits of one type of activity (say conventional participation), while reducing the costs or benefits of other activities (say unconventional participation). We use a theoretical framework that links political, social, and economic experiences to the costs and benefits of different forms of political participation, which focuses specifically on personal and national economic conditions, political corruption, and crime victimization.

This theoretical framework rests upon the notion that, while the perceived benefits of political action are partly driven by people's political motivations — particularly, the willingness to express grievances caused by government failure — participation decisions are constrained by personal experiences with adversity that limit people's ability to bear participation costs. The influence of distressful

conditions is, thus, hard to predict, since personal grievances and experiences of hardship may affect the participation calculus in different ways. Although propositions along these lines have been tested in previous studies, little is known about the extent to which disappointment with government performance within different policy domains (e.g. handling of the economy, and of issues such as crime and corruption) may spur unconventional forms of involvement, perhaps at the expense of participation in mainstream activities.

In developing countries like Argentina, where large changes in economic conditions are the rule (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006), economic concerns could be an important trigger for participation. Political scientists studying participation have considered both the effects of personal financial or economic problems, such as being unemployed or struggling to make ends meet, as well as national economic conditions that affect the wider community of the country as a whole, like dissatisfaction with the state of the economy, the unemployment rate, or the rate of inflation. Attributing blame to the government and political parties for their failure to prevent or address economic problems can enable voters to engage in rational retrospective voting (Feldman, 1982; Iyengar, 1991).

Perhaps it is the nature of the economic problem — whether it gives rise to collective or personal concerns — that determines the direction of the influence of economic evaluations on political participation. Blaming the government for creating (or failing to ameliorate) poor economic conditions, may motivate individuals to connect to the political process to express their dissatisfaction (Levin et al. 2015; Rosenstone, 1982; Brody and Sniderman, 1977; Thomassen, 1989). Depending on the availability and effectiveness of traditional forms of involvement, these socially-located grievances may be channeled through institutionalized or non-institutionalized means. Individuals hit by economic adversity, however, may take it upon themselves to improve their personal financial outlook (Rosenstone, 1982; Brody and Spiderman, 1977), and may rather spend time directly addressing their problems, or trying to force the government to provide an immediate solution by disrupting the normal state of affairs, than communicating their needs through conventional modes. We thus expect personal experiences with economic adversity to inhibit involvement in conventional activities, but not in unconventional ones where frustration with personal circumstances might actually stimulate involvement.

Following these theories, we test the following hypotheses regarding the impact of economic evaluations on political participation:

H1a Both conventional and unconventional participation are motivated by a negative outlook about the prospects for the national economy.

H1b A negative outlook for personal finances inhibits conventional participation, but motivates unconventional participation.

Attributing blame to the government and political parties for their failure to address problems may also influence individual participation decisions. In Argentina, a nation with relatively weak political institutions, where citizens are likely to encounter incompetent bureaucracies and to personally experience political clientelism and misconduct (Balán, 2011; Canache and Allison, 2005; Stokes, 2005; Svensson, 2005; Weitz-Shapiro, 2008), negative experiences with political actors could be important drivers of political action. In particular, political participation may be negatively affected by perceptions of corruption. Like most of the literature on political participation, the effects of corruption have focused mostly on turnout. While some authors find a positive relation between corruption and voter turnout (Johnston, 1983), the general view, supported by empirical research, is that corruption has a demobilizing effect (Birch, 2010; Davis, Ai Camp, and Coleman, 2004; McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Norris, 2011; Simpser, 2013).

But what about the influence of corruption on other forms of participation? Previous research on Bolivia has shown that citizens who witness corruption are more likely to engage in unconventional participation (Gingerich, 2009). Those who experience corruption may be motivated to engage in protests and other similar political activities intended to disrupt daily life. Furthermore, political and economic corruption occur typically, or is more widespread, where political institutions are weak, where political actors act outside the law in order to accomplish their goals. Previous research has shown that in these types of situations, political participation will similarly occur beyond the conventional pathways of politics (Boulding, 2010; Machado et al., 2011).

Consistent with previous research, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H2 Perceptions of greater levels of corruption discourage conventional participation, but stimulate unconventional participation.

In Argentina, corrupt practices by politicians and law enforcement officials are often associated with criminal activity and episodes of violent crime. After having been considered one of the safest in Latin America only a few decades ago, the country has seen a large increase in crime rates and perceptions of insecurity in recent years, a situation that has spurred the use of private self-defense measures, growth of the private security industry, and changes in habits in the population (Dammert and Malone, 2008; Eaton, 2008; Smulovitz, 2003). In the context of this deteriorating situation, disappointment with the success of government efforts to control crime, particularly among those who have had personal experiences with crime, could be a key determinant of participation decisions.

Until recently, crime victimization was not considered a relevant variable in explaining political participation, as it was taken as self-evident that crime victimization would generate a sense of powerlessness and a depressive state in victims that would cause them to withdraw from social activities (Bateson 2012). While some recent studies have supported this conventional wisdom (Trelles and Carreras, 2012), there is growing evidence suggesting that victims of violence and crime may be more motivated to participate than their non-victimized counterparts. Bellows and Miguel (2009), Blattman (2009), and Voors et al. (2012) found that victims of violent conflict during civil wars show increased levels of civic engagement in postwar years. Bateson (2012), using survey data from numerous countries, found that crime victims show heightened levels of participation in political activities. More recently, Hersh (2013) found that relatives of 9/11 victims became more politically involved after the terrorist attacks.

According to Bateson (2012), crime victimization may stimulate political involvement, as victims or their relatives may become instrumentally-motivated activists that seek to prevent or fight the occurrence of crimes they were victims of. As noted by the author, political activism by victims may successfully affect public policy, as evidenced by the naming of punitive laws after victims in different countries, with a notable example being the Blumberg laws in Argentina. But Bateson is careful to note that victims of crimes may also participate for non-instrumental reasons. The anger felt by victims may fuel emotions and energies that some may channel for political ends. Other victims, striving to overcome feelings of fear and powerlessness, may find relief in expressing and sharing their emotions by means of political activism.

While this argument implies that crime victims should engage more actively in any kind of political activity, it is reasonable to expect that they would do so with the feeling that the system has failed them, and would therefore be more likely to choose non-institutionalized means of involvement. This is likely to be the case in Argentina. The growing sense of insecurity, coupled with indignation brought about by cases of police abuse, have fed the emergence of spontaneous protests and organized groups working to affect the formulation of security policies (Eaton, 2008; Smulovitz, 2003). These observations lead us to our fourth and last hypothesis:

H3a Crime victimization encourages both conventional and unconventional political participation.

H3b The mobilization effect of crime victimization is stronger for unconventional activities than for conventional ones.

In the next section, we describe the methodology used to: (1) classify respondents into participatory types based on their propensity to participate in more or less conventional activities; and (2) test the above hypotheses about the influence of personal concerns (over the state of the economy, spread of corruption, and having been the victim of a crime) on conventional and unconventional participation in Argentina.

Methodology

In the model we develop in this paper citizens can participate in multiple political activities. We model individuals' propensity to participate in each activity using two binary latent classes, one associated with more conventional behavior and the other associated with more unconventional behavior; and these classes can be affected in different ways by the covariates of interest. Importantly, we allow activities to be affected by both the conventional and unconventional latent classes; which in turn, allows us to derive a data-driven characterization of the different political activities considered.

Latent predispositions toward conventional and unconventional participation can be a result of both measurable and unobserved factors, including socio-demographic attributes that determine the acquisition of civic skills and individuals' access to politically-relevant resources such as money and time, political attitudes and life experiences that contribute to the development of individuals' interest in politics and public affairs, and personality traits and social connections, that while often not directly measurable, can affect tendencies toward political involvement. By explicitly considering different latent predispositions for conventional and unconventional participation, this model allows us to study the sources of each form of involvement. In particular, it allows us to evaluate whether citizens' dissatisfaction with the political establishment (due to the government's poor handling of the economy, its embrace of clientelistic practices, and its inability to keep crime at bay) motivates involvement in more unconventional activities, yet depresses participation in conventional politics, or vice versa.

We conduct our analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate individuals' latent predispositions. This allows us to classify respondents into four groups: (1) *outsiders*, who are unlikely to be involved in political activities; (2) *activists*, who are likely to participate in any political activity; (3) *agitators*, who are more likely to participate in unconventional activities than in conventional ones; and finally, (4) conventionals, who are more highly predisposed toward conventional participation. Previous studies of political participation also used a typological approach (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Milbrath, 1960; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Verba and Nie, 1972).⁹ Barnes and Kaase (1979), for instance, classify individuals into five categories (*inactives, conformists, reformists, activists, and protesters*) that are related to the ones defined above. Thus, our paper re-introduces the typological approach, but our methodology allows us to do so in a less arbitrary manner. Our classification, although in line with conventional wisdom, is derived from the data. This is a key rationale for the use of the latent class model in this context: if some of these participatory behaviors are uncorrelated with either latent predisposition (conventional or unconventional), the model will tell us that; furthermore, the model will classify each type of participation based on the data, not based on arbitrary assumptions made by researchers.

In the second stage, we study the role of economic, political, and social insecurities in shaping the classification of individuals into the four participatory types as a function of our variables of interest: evaluation of the economy and personal finances, and crime victimization. In order to control for individuals' ability to bear participation costs, we include measures of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, since these individual attributes are thought to affect individuals' access to politically relevant resources and skills (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).

Formally, the first step model specification is given by the following expression:

$$Y_{i,j} \sim Bernoulli(p_{i,j})$$
$$logit(p_{i,j}) = \alpha_j + \alpha_{C,j}(T_{C,i} - 1) + \alpha_{U,j}(T_{U,i} - 1)$$

where $Y_{i,j}$ is a binary indicator for participation in activity j for individual i; $p_{i,j}$ is the probability that individual i participates in activity j; α_j is an intercept that varies by activity j; $T_{C,i}$ denotes the conventional trait of individual i, which can take values 1 (Low conventional trait) and 2 (High conventional trait); $T_{U,i}$ denotes the unconventional trait of individual i, which can take values 1 (Low unconventional trait) and 2 (High unconventional trait); $\alpha_{C,j}$ is a non-negative coefficient capturing

⁹One of the first studies of this kind is Milbrath (1960), who proposed the classification of individuals into three categories (gladiators, spectators, and apathetics), based on their overall level of political involvement. Verba and Nie (1972) proposed a different typology, classifying individuals into six categories (inactives, voting specialists, communalists, parochial participants, campaigners, and complete activists), depending on the type of conventional activities they participate in. Milbrath and Goel (1977) and Barnes and Kaase (1979) extended the typological approach by considering both conventional and unconventional participation.

the influence of $T_{C,i}$ on involvement in activity j; and $\alpha_{U,j}$ is a non-negative coefficient capturing the influence of $T_{U,i}$ on involvement in activity j. With the estimated conventional and unconventional traits, we construct the four two-dimensional types: outsiders, agitators, conventionals, and activists.

To prevent label-switching between latent classes in this model, we need to impose some restrictions on the parameters. First, we restrict the effect of the conventional trait on participation in street blockades to be zero (that is, $\alpha_{C,block} = 0$). Second, we restrict the effect of the unconventional trait on participating in municipal meetings to be zero (that is, $\alpha_{U,Municipalmeeting} = 0$). Finally, we fix the type of 14 individuals who participate in all activities traditionally considered conventional but in none of the ones traditionally considered unconventional to $T_{C,i} = High$ and $T_{U,i} = Low$; and the type of three individuals who participate in none of the activities traditionally considered conventional but in all of the ones traditionally considered unconventional to $T_{C,i} = Low$ and $T_{U,i} = High$.

In the second stage, we model the classification of individuals into the four combined type assignments from the first stage, taking care to incorporate classification uncertainty. We do so by first drawing J samples from the estimated distribution of participatory types for each individual, then estimating a multinomial logit model to explain type assignments for each *j*th draw, and finally combining the results of the J estimations into overall estimates that accurately account for classification uncertainty. We conducted a simulation study to determine the minimum value of J required to successfully incorporate classification uncertainty. Based on the results of this study, we set J = 30. After repeatedly estimating the 2nd stage model using MCMC methods, we pool parameter chains across all J estimations and use the resulting matrix to summarize the distribution of quantities of interest. In Appendix B of the Supplementary Materials we present the details of our simulation study, and other details associated with the estimation of the models we report in the next section of the paper.

In specifying the second-stage model, we assume that each individual selected the combined type t that maximizes his or her utility, where $t \in T = \{outsider, conventional, agitator, activist\}$, and that utilities associated with each combined type are a function of socio-demographic attributes, life experiences, and political attitudes. As the main variables of interest, we include evaluations of the national economy and personal finances, crime victimization, and perceptions of corruption. More formally, we model preferences over the combined types using the following random utility model:

$$u_{i,t} = X_i B_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where $u_{i,t}$ is the utility perceived by individual *i* from behaving in line with type *t*; X_i is a vector of covariates explaining preferences over the combined types; B_t is a vector of coefficients that varies by combined type *t*, capturing the impact of covariates X_i on $u_{i,t}$; and, $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is an error term following an extreme value distribution. In line with McFadden (1974), we assume that individuals choose the combined type that maximizes $u_{i,t}$.¹⁰ To ensure the identification of the model parameters, we set coefficients associated with the baseline type (outsiders), to zero. That is, we set $B_1 = 0$ such that $u_{i,1} = 0$.

Data

We use data from the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Argentina survey waves of the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted by Vanderbilt University and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella with the field work carried out by MBC Mori Consultores.¹¹ The project uses a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total sample size of 1,410, 1,512, and 1,512, for 2010, 2012, and 2014, respectively. The surveys involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish.

There are two important reasons why we chose Argentina to test our hypotheses and apply our latent class model. First, unlike many nations in the world, in Argentina unconventional political activities are more common. As we have discussed earlier, protests, street blockades, and other forms of unconventional activity occur with regularity in Argentina, and have been used by citizens to accomplish important political, economic, and social change. Second, because of the relative frequency of unconventional political activities, there is rich data on these activities in the LAPOP survey data. As far as we are aware, there is no nation where such rich data on unconventional political participation has been recently collected. The richness of the LAPOP data on Argentina allows us to not only look at a wide array of conventional and unconventional forms of political behavior, it also provides a wide set of important covariates that we can use for testing our hypotheses. Thus, Argentina is an excellent case for studying the four faces of political participation.

Using the LAPOP data, we define dependent variables based on answers to a question about involvement in different political activities during the year preceding the survey. The activities considered are: participating in a municipal meeting; requesting help from municipal government; requesting

 $[\]overline{ ^{10}\text{Since error terms } \varepsilon_{i,t} \text{ follow an extreme value distribution, the probability that individual } i \text{ has combined type } t, q_{i,t}, \text{ can be modeled as follows: } q_{i,t} = \frac{e^{X_i B_t}}{\sum\limits_{\forall k \in T} e^{X_i B_t}}.$

¹¹The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org, 2010, 2012, and 2014.

help from a local authority; helping solve a problem in the community; participating in a committee of improvements; participating in professional, trade, or farmers' associations; and participating in meetings of a political party; participating in peaceful protests; participating in street or road blockades; and participating in strikes. While many of these activities may not be considered political from the point of view of American politics, they are so in the Argentinian context. In particular trade unions have been at the center of Argentinian politics since at least the 1940s when the Peronist movement developed; many trade union members build a career in party politics, mostly supporting one or another faction in the Peronist movement. Farmers' associations jumped to the center of the political scene during the 2008 conflict between farmers and the federal government over commodities' export taxes and tend to be an important source of political organization in rural areas and smaller cities.¹² Many neighborhood associations developed in the aftermath of the 2001 Argentine economic crisis, particularly in lower income areas, and have become increasingly intertwined with local and national politics; in some cases, like the Organización Barrial Tupac Amaru, they have developed into a powerful political movement.

We excluded voting from the analysis in this paper. This is because the compulsory nature of voting makes it less interesting to study together with the political activities we consider that are of a fundamentally different nature because of their voluntary character. As we mentioned in the introduction, we do not believe this represents a significant drawback for our results.

In order to test our first set of hypotheses we used questions about retrospective evaluations on the evolution of the national economy and personal finances. Respondents were asked whether they consider economic conditions improved, remained the same, or worsened; and whether their personal economic situation improved, remained the same, or worsened in the last 12 months. To test our hypothesis concerning the perception of corruption, we constructed a measure of trust based on responses to a question that asked respondents whether they believe, based on experience or what they have heard, that corruption among public officials in the country is either very common, common, uncommon, or very uncommon. From this question we constructed a variable with four values, from 0 (very uncommon) to 3 (very common). For the last set of hypotheses, we used answers to a question asking respondents whether they have been victims of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats, or any other type of crime in the 12 months prior to the survey.

For controls, we use age in years, years of education, gender, self-reported non-white ethnicity,

¹²Agricultural policy has been a contentious issue in Argentina, particularly following the boom in agricultural commodity prices in the mid-2000s. Agricultural goods represent about 50% of the country's exports.

ideology on a scale from 1 (left wing) to 10 (right wing), residence in the City of Buenos Aires, residence in a large city other than Buenos Aires, and interview year. Finally, almost every study on political participation uses income as a control variable.¹³ One of the main issues with this variable is the large degree of survey non-response. Data from multiple years for Argentina also suffers from the effects of high inflation that make temporal comparisons hard to assess. To avoid both these problems we constructed a proxy for income based on the number of the following items respondents report having at home: refrigerator, landline telephone, cellular telephone, car, washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, computer, internet, TV, flat panel TV, and connection to the sewage system.

Finally, below we focus on presentation of the results that are estimated on data pooled across these three different waves of the LAPOP data for Argentina. Missing values in the variables included in the analysis were imputed using the R package *mice* (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011). Pooling the data across the three waves requires that we assume that the parameters are invariant with respect to time, an assumption that we discuss further in the paper's Supplementary Materials (where we present results for each of the three survey years, estimated using a hierarchical model with year effects). There is little evidence of substantial differences in the model estimates between the three survey waves, and by pooling across the three waves we increase the efficiency of our analysis thus providing more accurate estimates.

Results

We estimated our models via Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, using the software package JAGS (Plummer, 2003). In estimating our first-stage model, we applied flat normal priors on α_j , and flat log-normal priors on $\alpha_{C,j}$ and $\alpha_{U,j}$. Additionally, we set categorical priors on participatory classes $T_{C,i}$ and $T_{U,i}$, and Dirichlet priors on type probabilities. We let the MCMC algorithm run until all parameters of the 1-stage (measurement) model had converged to their stable posterior distribution. After that, we estimated our second-stage (explanatory) model J = 30 times, using a different draw from the posterior distribution of participatory types as dependent variable at each *j*th instance, to incorporate classification uncertainty. In estimating our second-stage model, we applied flat multivariate

¹³Ideally we would also have a good scale measure for factual political knowledge. Unfortunately, the information necessary for such a scale does not exist across the different waves of the survey data we use. Rather, we rely upon our measures of educational attainment and income to control for political knowledge; a range of studies of measures of political knowledge and information has shown a positive and often strong correlation between education, income, and political knowledge (Della Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Alvarez 1997; Barabas, et al. 2014).

normal priors on B_t . According to Gelman-Rubin's (1992) convergence diagnostic, coefficients from both first- and second-stage models converged to their invariant posterior distribution.

Participatory Types and Political Involvement

Participatory types are not fixed for each individual. Instead, each respondent has a probability of being assigned to each of the four types. Figure 1 presents a scatterplot that gives the relationship between the probability of being assigned a high conventional type, and the probability of being assigned a high unconventional type. Each point in the plot corresponds to a survey respondent. Based on these individual level probabilities for each individual, we computed predicted types by considering their modal assignment. Specifically, those assigned a high type more than 50% of the time were classified as having a high type in either conventional or unconventional participation, and the rest were classified as low type.

As a result, 80.9% of the sample was classified as having low conventional participatory type, and 90.3% as having a low unconventional participatory type. From there, we divide the classification into four categories of participatory types. Starting in the upper right cell are the *activists*, who are classified as high conventional and high unconventional participation, and are only 2.7% of the sample. Moving clockwise, in the lower right cell are those classified as low unconventional and high conventional types, which we call the *conventionals*, and they are 16.4% of the sample. Next, in the lower left cell of Figure 1 are the *outsiders*, who are 73.9% of the sample, and who are classified as low unconventional participation. Finally in the upper left cell of Figure 1 are the *agitators*, comprising 7.0% of the sample; they are individuals who are classified as high unconventional and low conventional participation.

Table 1 shows the point estimates and 95% credible intervals for the $\alpha_{C,j}$ and $\alpha_{U,j}$ parameters. These are estimates of the effect of high conventional and high unconventional predispositions on participation in activity j. Note that one parameter in each column is normalized to 0.00 for identification (blockade, for conventional participation; municipal meetings, for unconventional participation). As expected, the parameters reflecting the effect of the high conventional type ($\alpha_{C,j}$'s) are larger for conventional activities than unconventional ones, in particular the parameters for municipal meetings, contacting the municipality, contacting authorities, and attending improvement meetings. Similarly, the parameters of the effect of the high unconventional type ($\alpha_{U,j}$'s) are larger for unconventional activities, especially protesting, and participation in strikes and blockades. This result implies that the



Note: The plot depicts the relationship between the probability of being assigned a high conventional type (horizontal axis) and the probability of being assigned a high unconventional type (vertical axis) for individual respondents in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Argentina LAPOP surveys. Each quadrant corresponds to a face of political participation (activists, conventionals, outsiders, and agitators). Circles represent survey respondents.

consideration of two dimensions of political participation – conventional and unconventional – is supported by the observed behavior of the individuals in our data. It is worth noting that the coefficients for attending party meetings and working for a party have estimates that are quite similar for both the conventional and unconventional participatory types, perhaps reflecting the nature of the party system, or the result of weak partisan affiliations in contemporary Argentina (e.g., Arce and Mangonnet 2013; Lupu 2013). These two activities also serve as a warning against ad hoc classifications of activities, as they clearly defy a straightforward categorization. Our model, on the other hand, allows us to incorporate the dual nature of these two activities, by allowing them to load on both the conventional and unconventional participatory types.

		Conventional	Unconventional				
	Mean	95% Credible Interval	Mean	95% Credible Interval			
Municipal meetings	3.73	(3.16, 4.51)	0.00	(0.00, 0.00)			
Improvement meeting	3.34	(2.95, 3.76)	2.17	(1.74, 2.60)			
Party meeting	3.19	(2.78, 3.64)	2.93	(2.50, 3.42)			
Contact authorities	2.98	(2.66, 3.33)	1.43	(1.03, 1.81)			
Contact municipality	2.62	(2.34, 2.90)	1.11	(0.77, 1.44)			
Work for party	2.37	(2.04, 2.72)	1.95	(1.57, 2.32)			
Association meeting	2.18	(1.85, 2.51)	1.42	(1.04, 1.80)			
Solve problem	1.97	(1.75, 2.19)	1.21	(0.94, 1.48)			
Protest	1.25	(0.81, 1.66)	5.06	(4.48, 5.72)			
Strike	0.15	(0.00, 0.70)	3.49	(3.08, 3.91)			
Block	0.00	(0.00, 0.00)	5.24	(4.60, 6.18)			

Table 1: Participatory Types and Political Involvement

Note: The table provides posterior means and 95% credible intervals for parameters $\alpha_{C,j}$'s (columns 1-3) and $\alpha_{U,j}$'s (columns 4-6). These parameters capture the influence of each latent trait (conventional and unconventional, respectively) on participation in each political activity. The larger the estimate for activity j, the greater the influence of the corresponding latent trait.

Figure 2 shows the predicted participation probabilities in each activity for the four combinations of conventional and unconventional types, calculated from the estimated parameters for the high conventional and unconventional types, and the activity specific intercepts (α_j 's). The activities are ordered according to the extent to which they are affected by conventional predispositions (that is, from higher $\alpha_{C,j}$ to lower $\alpha_{C,j}$). Political activities such as participation in protests, strikes, and street blockades are less affected by conventional inclinations, and are therefore located toward the extreme right of the spectrum. Among the unconventional activities, the results show that individuals in all participatory types are more likely to participate in protests than in strikes and street blockades. While agitators and activists are more than 86% likely to do so, conventionals are 13% likely to do so, and outsiders about 4% likely to participate in protests. Involvement in street blockades is extremely unlikely for individuals with low unconventional types (conventionals and outsiders); but for the high unconventional types, the probability of engaging in a street blockade is around 50%. Finally, while participation in strikes is unlikely for outsiders and conventionals category, individuals with high unconventional participatory types (agitators and activists) have propensities to participate in strikes of more than 30%. This is smaller than propensities to participate in protests and street blockades, which might be due to the fact that participation in strikes is possible only for individuals who are employed.

Among conventional political activities, outsiders show low propensities to participate in all activities (below 5%), except for contributing to solving a community problem, where they are 16%likely to participate. For individuals classified as conventionals, participation probabilities for conventional activities range from around 18% for working for a political party to 58% for helping solve a community problem. But for individuals in the agitators category, the probability of participating in conventional activities lies between 10% and 21%, except for participation in municipal meetings (which remains close to zero) and contributing to solving a community problem (which almost reaches 39%). A conventional activity where the likelihood of participation is relatively large for agitators is participation in meetings of political parties (about 21%). Qualitatively, it is clear that agitators and conventionals are politically involved; but the results presented here indicate that the difference between agitators and conventionals are that the conventionals are somewhat more likely to be in involved in conventional political activities than the agitators; the agitators are somewhat more likely to be involved in unconventional forms of participation. Finally, individuals classified as activists show participation probabilities above 48% for all conventional activities except participating in municipal meetings and strikes (where the probability lies around 22%). The conventional activities with the highest propensities for this group are participating in party meetings, in meetings of improvements committees, and contributing to solving a community problem, reaching more than 80%.

Overall, our results show that individuals with low unconventional types (outsiders and agitators) are more likely to engage in conventional activities that involve a low degree of engagement, like requesting help from authorities or the municipality, whereas individuals with high unconventional (agitators and activists) type are more likely to engage in conventional activities that require a greater involvement, like participating in improvement committees and political party meetings. Our results

Figure 2: Participation Probabilities by Type





Note: The plot depicts the baseline probabilities of participating in each political activity for individuals of each type (outsiders, agitators, conventionals, and activists). For each type, activities are sorted (from left to right) and colored (progressing from lighter to darker shades) from more to less conventional as measured by $\alpha_{C,j}$'s (see first column of Table 1). Bars indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for baseline participation probabilities.

also indicate that contributing to solve a community problem cannot be easily characterized as either a conventional or unconventional activity, as all participatory types show relatively high participation probabilities (about 82%, 58%, 39%, and 16% probabilities for activists, conventionals, agitators, and outsiders, respectively).

Influence of Individual Attributes on Type Assignment

We start by examining our coefficient estimates and their associated 95% credible intervals, shown in Figure 3. As noted before, to identify the model, we use the outsider type (low conventional and unconventional participation propensities) as a baseline. The results suggest that greater educational attainment is related with an increased likelihood of activist and agitator assignment. The next result



Figure 3: Determinants of Assignment into Participatory Types

Note: The plot depicts posterior means and 95% credible intervals for the coefficients of our second-stage multinomial logit model.

is consistent with previous research on political participation: age is associated with an increased likelihood of being involved as a high conventional type. The common finding that older individuals are more engaged in political activities holds insofar as the activities considered are conventional ones, but appears untrue for unconventional activities. Women are more likely to belong to types that engage more actively in conventional activities relative to the baseline type, although the gender gap in participation is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimates for the indicator variable for non-white respondents shows that they are more likely to belong to any of the three participatory types with respect to being an outsider, though not significantly so. Higher income, in turn, is associated with lower likelihood of being assigned a conventional or activist type, relative to being an outsider. Individuals with a more right-wing ideology are less likely to be an agitator or activist, but more likely to be conventional, relative to the baseline, suggesting that right-wing individuals have a preference towards conventional activities rather than unconventional ones. Finally, being interviewed in 2012 or 2014 is associated with a considerably lower likelihood of being involved as a high conventional or unconventional type, compared to those interviewed in 2010, the year of the Argentina Bicentennial celebrations.¹⁴ In Appendix D of the Supplementary Materials we present the estimates of a model where covariate effects are allowed to vary by year. The coefficients for the different years are generally consistent with one another, so we focus on the pooled coefficients.

Since the model coefficients are difficult to interpret, we simulated baseline probabilities of assignment to each participatory type and marginal effects of changes in the main explanatory variables of interest on the likelihood of being classified into the different types, relative to the baseline, for a hypothetical individual with typical socio-demographic characteristics.¹⁵ We also calculated 95% credible intervals for these probabilities and marginal effects.¹⁶ Baseline assignment probabilities stand at 6.4% for the activist type; at 9.2% for the agitator type; and at 18.8% for the conventional type. This leaves a high chance (65.6%) of assignment into the outsider type. Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict credible intervals indicating the effect of marginal changes in covariates of interest on assignment probabilities.

Our simulations show that perceptions of a deterioration in the national economy are associated with lower probability of assignment into the activist type and higher probability of assignment into the outsider type (see Figure 4, left panel), although effects are small in magnitude. In particular, thinking that the national economy got worse instead of improving, is associated with a 3.0 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of assignment into the activist type and 3.7 percentage point increase in the probability of outsider type. A voter's personal financial outlook has no significant effects in general (Figure 4, right panel). These results are inconsistent with hypothesis H1a, as they suggest that there is a moderately negative correlation between a worsened outlook about the national economy and individuals' classification into high participatory types, instead of a positive one. Similarly, our findings do not support hypothesis H1b, that self-located concerns depress political participation, as responses to this variable fall below statistical confidence levels.

¹⁴Given that the 2010 interviews were conducted between March and April, the participation questions cover a significant portion of 2009. The increased likelihood of being a high conventional or unconventional type for those individuals interviewed in 2010 is possibly a reflection of the heightened levels of political conflict observed during 2009. Part of this was the aftermath of the 2008 conflict between the Government and Farmers, but it also included the passage of a controversial media law. Moreover, it coincided with the lowest levels of confidence in the National Government of the Kirchner Era (2003-2015); as well as with the 2009 legislative elections, that were moved from their usual October date to earlier in June, and during which the Government performed poorly and lost its majority in both chambers of Congress.

¹⁵The hypothetical individual has 11 years of education, is 37 years of age, male, white, with an income proxy level of 9 on a scale of 0-14, an ideology of 5 on a 10-point left to right scale, thinks that the national economic situation has improved over the last 12 months, that his personal economic situation has also improved over the same period, has not been a victim of a crime in the last 12 months, believes corruption is a little generalized, does not live in the capital of the country nor in a big city, and was interviewed in 2010.

¹⁶Table C1, available in Appendix C of the Supplementary Materials, gives baseline probabilities of assignment to each type (first row of each table) and marginal effects for covariates included in the model (rows 2-13).

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Economic Evaluations



Economic Evaluations

Note: The plots depict the effects of a marginal decline in evaluations of the national (left) and personal (right) economy, from "better" to "worse," on the probabilities of being assigned outsider, agitator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects.

The minor importance of national economic evaluations for explaining assignment into high participatory types is somewhat surprising given the preeminence of economic concerns in Argentina. Indeed, when citizens in Argentina are asked about the issues they consider to be the most important the country faces, economic considerations like unemployment and inflation are invariably on top of the list in recent years (LAPOP, 2010, 2012, 2014). The absence of a mobilization effect of economic concerns could signify that citizens view economic problems as bigger than themselves and unlikely to be affected by their decision to participate politically. But it could also mean that economic motivations for political participation were not particularly important during the period under study; since these surveys were conducted during the recovery from the financial crisis recession, economic concerns could be dampened in importance relative to the immediate past.¹⁷ Moreover, it is possible that in Argentina, accustomed to significant economic crises (like in the late 1990's and early 2000's),

¹⁷We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that in 2014 Argentina was in recession. But it is worth noting that the 2014 wave of the LAPOP survey was conducted earlier in the year. Therefore, economic evaluations refer, for the most part, to 2013, a year with mild economic growth. Moreover, Figure D1 in the supplementary materials, which displays coefficient effects by year, shows that economic evaluations in 2014 had similar effects to those of the other years in the sample.

economic concerns trigger political participation only in situations in which the national economic or personal finances are exceptionally problematic and citizens are highly motivated to induce political leaders for a change in the economic direction of the country.





Note: The plot depicts the effects of a marginal increase in perceptions of corruption, from "a little" to "very" generalized, on the probabilities of being assigned outsider, agitator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects.

Next, we examined the relationship between the perception of corruption and type assignment. We found that individuals who think that corruption among public officials is "very generalized" instead of "a little generalized" are 2.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned an outsider type and 3.0 percentage points more likely to be assigned an agitator type (see Figure 5). Conversely, a similar increase in the perception of corruption is associated with a 3.8 percentage points reduction in the probability of being assigned conventional type, and 1.8 percentage point reduction in the probability of activist assignment. Although some of these effects do not reach our threshold of statistical significance, the changes are consistent with the idea that individuals who doubt the honesty of government officials are more likely to get involved in unconventional political activities, thus becoming less likely to be assigned to the conventional and activist types; while at the same time becoming more likely to get involved in unconventional assignments into agitators, and partly compensating for the higher likelihood of becoming outsiders. These results are consistent with hypothesis H2.

Figure 6: Marginal effects of Crime Victimization



Note: The plot depicts the effects of having been the victim of a crime on the probabilities of being assigned outsider, agitator, conventional, and activist types. Points indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects.

Finally, we found that victims of a crime show an increased likelihood of being assigned to all types relative to the outsiders baseline (Figure 6). This is consistent with the mobilization effect found in recent studies of the impact of crime victimization on political participation, and in line with hypothesis H3a. Overall, being the victim of a crime decreases the likelihood of being labeled an outsider by as many as 10.4 percentage points. In terms of effect magnitude, no other individual attribute – among those included in our explanatory model – rivals the influence of crime victimization. The positive effect of crime victimization on political participation is largest for the classification into activist and conventional types, increasing their likelihood by 5.0 and 4.5 percentage points, respectively. The type with only unconventional participatory subtype (that is, agitators) shows smaller increases (3.0 percentage points). This last result contradicts hypothesis H3b, as it suggests that the mobilization effect of crime victimization is less intense for unconventional forms of involvement than for conventional ones.

Discussion

In this paper we argue that previous research on political participation has been limited, in that it has focused narrowly on conventional and unconventional involvement as independent forms of political expression. This is partly due to the fact that much of the research on participation has not studied cases like Argentina, where unconventional activities are relatively more common. It is also partly due to the fact that many studies have used methodologies that in general lead researchers to assume that these two types of activities are independent. Instead, we study participation in a nation where unconventional forms of political activity occur, and we develop the idea of the *four faces of political participation*, where citizens can simultaneously participate conventionally and unconventionally, do neither, or do one but not the other. This is an important point, as citizens can relate to the polity by using some political activities as complements or substitutes of the others. We advocate the use of latent class analysis, as it allows us to classify citizens as being one of four participatory types and thus provide a linkage between participation in different activities by the same individual; this approach also lets us examine what individual and contextual variables are associated with each type of participation. Thus our paper has both methodological and substantive implications.

We apply this methodology to recent survey data from Argentina, as it provides an excellent laboratory to test a number of hypotheses about how different individual and contextual factors might best be associated with each form of participation. We find that respondents who view corruption as generalized are more likely to be involved in unconventional political activities, and less so in conventional ones. Perhaps most importantly, we find that crime victimization encourages participation in both conventional and unconventional political activities. Finally, our results do not provide support for the expected association between the state of the economy and either conventional or unconventional political participation. Taken together, these findings suggest that during periods of relative economic stability, economic anxieties are not translated into political action. Distressful experiences of a non-economic nature (in the form of crime victimization), however, greatly increase people's political engagement.

The approach we develop here has applications in other nations, in particular those that have a greater incidence of unconventional forms of participation. By using this approach cross-nationally, we can better identify the association between contextual factors and forms of participation, in particular factors like economic performance, electoral institutions, and governmental institutions. There are many ways in which nations differ, in their electoral rules (for example, compulsory voting), culture, and political history. How those factors may shape the calculations behind conventional and unconventional participation need further study. This is particularly true for the question of compulsory voting: while we do not believe that Argentina's compulsory voting policy has a significant effect on the external validity of our results, that is an important question for future research. It will also be important for future work to test whether political systems that have more open and fluid means of conventional political participation have more citizens who participate in those ways, and whether more closed political systems with fewer opportunities for conventional participation lead more citizens to take the unconventional approach to expressing their political preferences.

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Supplementary Materials

A Turnout by Province and Municipalities in Buenos Aires Province

We claim that the introduction of reforms to the enforcement of mandatory voting by Ley 26.744 in 2012 did not have a significant effect in voter turnout, and therefore it is unlikely to have had an effect in the participation decision for other activities considered in this paper. The new law updated the fines for failing to vote without a valid excuse, and more importantly, a second new law (Ley 26.774) mandated the creation of a registry of offenders.¹⁸ Given that the law made it more costly to not vote, and made it significantly more likely for a non-voter to be caught, the reform should have a non-negative effect on turnout.

As we mentioned in the introduction, aggregate voter turnout in the closest Presidential election prior to the reform, that of 2011, reached 80.2%. In the first Presidential election after the reform, in 2015, voter turnout was 81.1% during a very contested election. While it is not possible to make accurate inferences of the effect of the reform in voter turnout, the fact that aggregate turnout only barely increased points to, at best, a quantitatively negligible positive effect. This small increase becomes even less important once we consider that turnout has had an upward trend since the turn of the century.

To provide a more disaggregated picture, Figure A1 shows how turnout changed between the last three Presidential elections at the province level. While turnout generally increased between the 2011 and 2015 Presidential election in most provinces, this increment was smaller than that observed between the 2007 and 2011 elections. This supports our argument that turnout increase is unlikely to be related to changes in the calculus of voting introduced by the improved enforcement of mandatory voting, but is instead related to a more general upward trend in turnout observed since before the reform.¹⁹

Figure A2 shows the change in turnout for Presidential elections in all the municipalities of Buenos Aires province.²⁰ It is important to note that municipalities in Buenos Aires province are very heterogeneous, including the high-income municipalities in the northern suburbs of the City of Buenos

¹⁸The lack of a registry of offenders prior to the reform effectively meant that the mandatory voting provision was generally not enforced. The registry law is Ley 26.774 de Ciudadanía Argentina, Congreso de la Nación Argentina, 2012.

¹⁹The most significant outlier in terms of turnout growth is Santiago del Estero province. This province had unusually low turnout in the early 2000s, as low as 55%, and has shown a steady increase since then, converging to the national average.

²⁰Data for Lezama *Partido* was added to the data from Chascomús *Partido*, from which it seceded in 2009.

Aires, as well as poverty stricken ones in the western and southern portions of that metropolitan area. It also includes medium sized industrial cities, and many agriculture-dependent small municipalities. As with the data on a provincial level, turnout increased in most municipalities between the Presidential elections of 2007 and 2011 (both before the reform). The evolution of turnout between the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections shows that in most municipalities where turnout increased, it was less than the increase in previous elections. Moreover, in about half of the municipalities turnout actually dropped.²¹

Determining the effects of the enhanced enforcement of mandatory voting on turnout is hard to do, especially since the reform affected the entire country. This is also beyond the scope of this paper. But the turnout statistics presented here show that it is very unlikely that the reform had a quantitatively important effect in the calculus of voting and thus in turnout. Moreover, this implies that second-order effects on participatory decisions for other political activities are likely to be negligible.

 $^{^{21}}$ The data actually suggests a mean-reverting process, in which municipalities with the highest increases in turnout prior to the reform are the ones with the highest decreases in turnout after the reform.





Note: Black dots represent changes in provincial turnout. The black square represents the change in national turnout





Note: Black dots represent changes in municipal turnout. The black square represents the change in provincial turnout

B Estimation

Our data analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, we estimated a latent class model for classification. In the second stage, we estimated a multinomial logit model to explain first stage assignment into participatory types. Since the dependent variable in our second stage model is an estimated quantity, we took steps to incorporate first stage classification uncertainty into our second stage estimates. Doing so involved: (1) estimating the first stage model and drawing J samples from the posterior distribution of participatory types, (2) repeatedly estimating the second stage model for each of these J draws, and (3) combining the results of these J estimations.

To find the optimal J, we estimated the second stage model 1,000 times, and repeatedly selected random subsets from these estimations to simulate the results for different J (1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and so on, up to 50). The selection of random subsets of estimations was repeated ten times for each J. We calculated the following quantities for each repetition and each J: (a) the average standard deviation of beta coefficients, and (b) the average width of credible intervals corresponding to beta coefficients. Figure B1 shows the relationship between these two measures of overall dispersion and J. The smooth line depicts average results for each J.

[FIGURE B1 ABOUT HERE]

The results depicted in Figure B1 suggest that uncertainty estimates increase sharply up to a certain point (between J = 5 and J = 15) and then stabilize. A relatively small J (around 30 estimations of the second stage model) are enough to fully account for the influence of classification uncertainty on the dispersion of parameter estimates. Further increasing J beyond that point (that is, estimating the second stage model a larger number of times) has no impact on standard deviations of model coefficients or the width of credible intervals. Accordingly, the results reported in the paper were calculated by combining the results obtained by repeatedly estimating the second stage model 30 times.



Note: In the upper (lower) panel, circles indicate the average standard deviation (width of credible intervals) of estimated coefficients over J estimations of the multinomial logit model. For each J, the smooth line indicates the average standard deviation (width of credible intervals) calculated over all sets of repeated estimations.

C Marginal Effects

	Outsiders			Agitators			Conventionals			Activists		
	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%
Baseline probability	65.6	59.2	71.5	9.2	5.7	13.4	18.8	14.2	23.9	6.4	2.9	11.7
Education (11 to 13 on 0-18 scale)	-2.3	-3.6	-1.2	0.5	-0.1	1.4	0.3	-0.6	1.1	1.5	0.5	3.1
Age $(37 \text{ to } 53 \text{ years old})$	-1.8	-3.8	0.0	-1.1	-2.1	-0.1	2.3	0.7	4.0	0.6	-0.7	2.4
Male to female	-0.9	-4.4	2.6	-1.3	-3.3	0.7	2.3	-0.6	5.2	-0.1	-2.8	2.6
White to non-white	-4.2	-8.1	-0.4	1.8	-0.6	4.5	1.7	-1.4	5.1	0.7	-2.2	4.2
Income proxy (9 to 11 on 0-14 scale)	1.3	-0.1	2.8	0.3	-0.5	1.3	-0.8	-1.9	0.3	-0.9	-2.1	0.1
Ideology (5 to 7 along 1-10 scale)	0.2	-1.9	2.2	-2.3	-3.7	-1.2	3.5	1.9	5.3	-1.3	-3.1	-0.0
National economy (better to worse)	3.7	-1.8	9.3	0.2	-3.2	3.8	-0.9	-5.1	3.5	-3.0	-7.1	0.0
$Personal\ economy\ ({\rm better}\ to\ worse)$	0.2	-5.2	5.4	-0.2	-3.5	3.4	1.1	-3.0	5.5	-1.1	-4.8	2.9
Crime victim (no to yes)	-10.4	-15.1	-6.0	0.8	-1.4	3.5	4.5	0.9	8.6	5.0	1.0	11.1
Corruption (a little to very)	2.6	-2.2	7.5	3.0	-0.7	6.7	-3.8	-7.7	-0.2	-1.8	-5.7	1.3
National capital (no to yes)	-3.2	-9.9	3.3	1.7	-2.0	5.9	0.1	-5.0	5.4	1.3	-3.1	6.7
Big city (no to yes)	0.1	-5.1	5.3	-1.0	-3.8	1.9	-0.8	-4.7	3.3	1.7	-2.0	6.5
Year 2010 to 2012	8.5	4.3	13.1	-3.1	-5.9	-0.7	-2.1	-5.8	1.4	-3.3	-7.2	-0.8
Year 2010 to 2014	7.9	3.7	12.2	-2.5	-5.1	-0.0	-2.0	-5.6	1.5	-3.4	-7.1	-0.9

Table C1: Changes in Assignment Probability

Voter Participation Types

Note: The table provides means and 95% credible intervals for the effect of marginal changes in explanatory and control variables included in the second-stage multinomial logit model.

D Model with Random Effects by Year



Figure D1: Determinants of Assignment into Participatory Types

Note: The plot depicts posterior means and 95% credible intervals for the coefficients of a second-stage multinomial logit model where coefficients were allowed to vary by survey year.

Table D1:	Changes	$_{\mathrm{in}}$	Assignment	Probability	by	Year
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Voter Participation Types

	Outsiders			Agitators			Conventionals			Activists			
Year 2010	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	
Baseline probability	64.0	54.4	72.5	9.3	4.6	16.1	21.8	14.6	31.3	5.0	1.6	11.2	
Education (11 to 13 on 0-18 scale)	-1.4	-3.0	0.0	-0.1	-1.0	0.8	0.5	-0.7	1.9	1.0	0.1	2.7	
Age (37 to 53 years old)	-1.9	-4.9	0.9	-1.2	-3.0	0.4	2.3	-0.2	5.1	0.9	-0.7	3.3	
Male to female	-0.2	-5.5	5.0	-2.6	-6.1	0.0	2.3	-2.5	7.3	0.4	-2.7	4.0	
White to non-white	-3.0	-8.7	2.8	3.5	-0.3	8.5	-0.8	-6.0	4.3	0.3	-3.2	3.9	
Income proxy (9 to 11 on 0-14 scale)	2.2	0.2	4.3	-0.5	-1.8	0.7	-0.6	-2.4	1.2	-1.2	-2.9	-0.1	
Ideology (5 to 7 along 1-10 scale)	1.4	-2.1	5.0	-3.9	-6.8	-1.8	4.1	1.5	7.2	-1.6	-4.3	-0.3	
National economy (better to worse)	8.3	0.4	16.6	-1.2	-6.4	3.7	-3.9	-11.7	3.0	-3.2	-8.4	-0.3	
Personal economy (better to worse)	2.6	-5.2	10.4	-1.2	-6.0	4.1	-0.5	-7.5	6.5	-1.0	-5.6	3.6	
Crime victim (no to yes)	-10.7	-16.8	-4.8	1.8	-2.0	6.8	6.2	0.5	12.9	2.7	-1.0	8.9	
Corruption (a little to very)	0.7	-6.8	8.4	5.3	-0.4	11.8	-6.3	-13.2	-0.6	0.4	-4.3	4.7	
National capital (no to yes)	-9.0	-19.0	0.7	-1.6	-7.3	4.1	5.5	-3.3	16.0	5.0	-0.9	15.1	
Big city (no to yes)	-4.4	-11.8	2.4	-2.3	-6.3	1.4	2.5	-3.4	9.4	4.2	-0.4	12.0	
Year 2012	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	
Baseline probability	74.2	67.9	80.0	6.6	3.9	10.2	16.0	11.0	22.1	3.2	1.1	6.4	
Education (11 to 13 on 0-18 scale)	-2.0	-3.5	-0.7	1.0	0.2	2.0	-0.0	-1.0	1.0	1.1	0.2	2.6	
Age (37 to 53 years old)	-1.2	-3.3	0.7	-0.5	-1.6	0.5	1.5	-0.2	3.3	0.3	-0.6	1.6	
Male to female	-1.3	-5.2	2.4	-0.5	-2.6	1.5	2.2	-1.3	5.7	-0.3	-2.2	1.4	
White to non-white	-3.1	-7.1	0.9	1.2	-1.1	3.8	1.3	-2.2	5.1	0.6	-1.6	3.0	
Income proxy (9 to 11 on 0-14 scale)	0.5	-1.1	2.1	0.6	-0.3	1.8	-1.0	-2.3	0.3	-0.2	-1.0	0.7	
Ideology (5 to 7 along 1-10 scale)	-1.2	-3.4	1.0	-1.2	-2.4	-0.0	2.7	0.8	4.7	-0.3	-1.4	0.8	
National economy (better to worse)	0.5	-5.5	6.0	0.3	-2.8	3.7	0.0	-4.9	5.3	-0.9	-3.5	1.7	
Personal economy (better to worse)	-3.1	-9.5	2.8	0.4	-2.7	4.0	3.2	-2.1	9.2	-0.5	-2.9	2.2	
Crime victim (no to yes)	-8.0	-13.9	-2.8	-0.1	-2.5	2.5	3.8	-0.4	8.5	4.3	0.7	10.3	
Corruption (a little to very)	4.2	-0.8	9.7	0.5	-2.8	3.8	-3.3	-8.1	1.0	-1.5	-4.2	0.3	
National capital (no to yes)	1.0	-6.2	8.0	1.9	-1.7	7.0	-2.3	-8.4	4.0	-0.6	-3.3	2.9	
Big city (no to yes)	2.6	-3.5	8.3	0.3	-2.6	4.1	-2.4	-7.3	2.6	-0.5	-2.9	2.6	
Year 2014	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	Mean	2.5%	97.5%	
Baseline probability	73.4	66.4	80.0	6.1	3.0	10.2	17.2	11.7	23.8	3.4	1.0	7.6	
Education (11 to 13 on 0-18 scale)	-2.6	-4.4	-1.1	0.9	0.2	1.9	0.4	-0.6	1.5	1.3	0.2	3.4	
Age (37 to 53 years old)	-1.7	-3.8	0.3	-0.6	-1.6	0.3	2.0	0.2	4.0	0.3	-0.7	1.8	
Male to female	-1.2	-5.1	2.7	-0.3	-2.4	1.6	2.1	-1.3	5.6	-0.6	-3.0	1.3	
White to non-white	-3.1	-7.3	1.1	0.6	-1.6	2.9	2.4	-1.3	6.3	0.1	-2.5	2.8	
Income proxy (9 to 11 on 0-14 scale)	0.2	-1.5	1.9	0.8	-0.2	2.0	-1.0	-2.4	0.3	-0.0	-1.0	1.1	
Ideology (5 to 7 along 1-10 scale)	-1.5	-3.7	0.7	-0.8	-2.1	0.3	2.7	0.8	4.6	-0.4	-1.7	0.8	
National economy (better to worse)	1.7	-4.7	7.9	0.5	-2.6	4.1	-1.3	-6.9	4.3	-1.0	-4.4	1.8	
Personal economy (better to worse)	-1.5	-8.1	4.5	0.3	-2.7	4.0	0.6	-4.7	6.1	0.5	-2.6	5.3	
Crime victim (no to yes)	-8.3	-14.2	-3.1	0.2	-2.0	2.8	4.8	0.5	9.7	3.3	-0.1	9.6	
Corruption (a little to very)	3.5	-1.7	8.9	0.9	-2.2	4.2	-2.6	-7.1	1.6	-1.8	-5.4	0.2	
National capital (no to yes)	0.7	-6.4	7.5	2.1	-1.3	6.9	-1.8	-7.6	4.5	-1.1	-4.5	2.4	
Big city (no to yes)	1.9	-4.2	7.6	-0.0	-2.8	3.4	-0.7	-5.7	4.7	-1.1	-4.5	2.0	

Note: The table provides means and 95% credible intervals for the effect of marginal changes in explanatory and control variables included in a multinomial logit model where coefficients were allowed to vary by survey year.